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**CIP-010-3 Software Verification for
Compliance and
Supply Chain Security Controls**

with Dick Brooks
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NERC Supply Chain Standards

- CIP-013-1
- CIP-010-3
- CIP-010-3 R1 Part 1.6 – Software Verification Requirements

CIP-010-3 Table R1 – Configuration Change Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.6	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems</p> <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems</p> <p>Note: Implementation does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders). Additionally, the following issues are beyond the scope of Part 1.6: (1) the actual terms and conditions of a procurement contract; and (2) vendor performance and adherence to a contract.</p>	<p>Prior to a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration associated with baseline items in Parts 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.5, and when the method to do so is available to the Responsible Entity from the software source:</p> <p>1.6.1. Verify the identity of the software source; and</p> <p>1.6.2. Verify the integrity of the software obtained from the software source.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to a change request record that demonstrates the verification of identity of the software source and integrity of the software was performed prior to the baseline change or a process which documents the mechanisms in place that would automatically ensure the identity of the software source and integrity of the software.</p>

NERC/NATF Guidance


Endorsed Implementation Guides

 Cyber Security Supply Chain Risk Management Plans

CIP-010-3 R1.6 Software Integrity and Authenticity (NATF)

Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019

Securing the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain



Implementation Guidance for Verifying the Identity of the Software Source and the Integrity of the Software with a Single Method

Some methods may complete both the verification of the identity of the software source and the verification of the integrity of the software obtained from the software source. Validation of digitally signed software is an example of a method that accomplishes both obligations required in CIP-010-3 Requirement 1, Part 1.6. Further, some processes may handle this in an automated fashion. One example of this is the Microsoft update process using Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) as described in the article found at the following link:

<https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/CIP-010-3%20R1.6%20Software%20Integrity%20and%20Authenticity.pdf>

Is this Guidance Accurate?

- NO
- A Digital Signature alone will not verify the identity of the party that produced the software
- Verification of identity requires two steps:
 1. Identify the party that produced the software
 2. Verify that the digital signature matches the name of the party that produced the software

SAG-PM™ PROCESS FLOW


Customer
Downloads
Software Object

Customer runs
SAG-PM™ to verify
Software Object

1. Perform introspection and process SBOM data
2. Verify Download Server Source Location/Certificate
3. Perform Virus Scan
4. Verify Digital Signature of software object
5. Perform Vulnerability (CVE) Search using NIST NVD
6. Perform Vendor Verification using Questionnaire data
7. Perform Provenance Check
8. Generate SAGScore™ (Trustworthiness Score)
9. Generate CIP-010-3 R1, Part 1.6 Proof of Verification/Evidence record, SAGPOV™
10. Save all findings and results in F850CR evidence file

SAG-PM™ Methodology


- *Never trust software, always verify and report!*™
- Corroborating evidence is key to establishing trust
- Even today some malware scanning engines fail to detect the malware used against Solarwinds



SAG-PM™ Components

Two Demos :

1. NIST C-SCRM
2. Microsoft PowerShell



SAG-PM™ Demonstration

- Create a SPDX SBOM when no SBOM is provided by a Vendor
- Demonstrate a suspicious digital signature and the Warning issued by SAG-PM™
- Demonstrate Evidence data (3 files)
 1. F850CR Evidence Data for Risk Assessment (all 7 steps)
 2. SBOM created by SAG-PM™
 3. Malware scanning results – Microsoft Defender

Demonstrate NIST C-SCRM

- Shows warning for digital signature mismatch

Demonstrate Microsoft PowerShell

- SBOM creation

Questions?

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